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BOOK REVIEW
LITERATURE, OBSCENITY & LAW. By Felice Flanery Lewis. Car-
bondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press. 1976. Pp. xi +
297. Cloth. $12.50.
Reviewed by David M. Brown*
Ms. Lewis, in a preface to her book, differentiates her anal-
ysis from the plethora of books and articles on the subject of
obscenity by its focus on the effect of obscenity litigation on the
development of literary trends in the United States and
abroad.
Although the book treats, in cursory fashion, the history of
obscenity law and notes the changing legal "standards" which
the courts have fashioned to deal with the elusive concepts
involved, this is not a work from which the law student or
practitioner will gain a comprehensive legal perspective. She
extracts from court opinions not the evolution of judicial trends
in obscenity litigation, but rather their validity as literary cri-
tiques. And, with minor exceptions, her focus is exclusively on
literature with a capital "L"-a focus which, in view of the
current judicial and prosecutorial emphasis on hard-core por-
nography, in most respects limits the work. It is indeed possible
to read this book as nothing more than a survey of the idiosyn-
cratic opinions held by judges, prosecutors, policemen, and
assorted vice society entrepreneurs on what constitutes good
literature, art, or genuine literary ability. As such, however,
the book has value only as a catalogue of curiosities-holding
up for deserved ridicule the absurd spectacle of legal judg-
ments couched in the language of pseudo-literary criticism.
One can, however, extract some feel for the problems this
field of law presents to practitioners, but only at some consider-
able cost to the reader in view of the author's technique and
style.
Positing the year 1890 as roughly the beginning of a
"sexual revolution" in literature and also the beginning "of a
sustained effort to censor fiction, regardless of its literary qual-
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ity, through legal action,"' the book is divided into chapters
each of which roughly encompasses a decade of activity (with
considerable overlapping because of the often lengthy hiatus
between the appearance or initial circulation of some works
and their entanglement with the courts or other pro censorship
forces).
Ms. Lewis has attempted to identify, and with some unfor-
tunate results to label, the dominant theme which she per-
ceives as characteristic of either a generally recognized trend
in literature or as common to the works which attracted legal
attention. The technique utilized is to quote at various length
from the books (or plays) litigated during a particular period,
to analyze the author's literary theme or intent, and to quote
from and analyze the various court decisions as they identify,
merge, and muddle varying elements of moral, literary, reli-
gious, and class standards into legal principles. The various
works and authors are compared to each other within each
period covered and contrasted to those preceding and follow-
ing, as are the recurring and often contradictory legal stan-
dards by which each was judged.
The essence of Ms. Lewis' assessment of legal opinions as
valid literary criticism is stated in her comments on a 1930 New
York opinion condemning as obscene the printed version of a
play written in 1903 by an author described as "a Viennese
doctor who in the 1890's had achieved an international repu-
tation as a brilliant and psychologically acute playwright and
novelist."2 In one section of the opinion, the court had com-
mented on the failure of the author's purpose, as perceived by
the court:
It is very clear that the author of the book now before us
• ..was not thinking of the spiritual, but devoted the
whole book to the animal instincts of the human race. His
efforts were not a lesson in morality, nor an attempt to
uplift the mind of the reader.'
Ms. Lewis notes that this opinion revealed "a theory that has
influenced many obscenity decisions, the belief that imagina-
tive literature should inspire or improve humanity-indeed,
1. F. LEwIs, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY & LAW 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEWIS].
2. Id. at 80.
3. People v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 243 N.Y.S. 193 (1st Dep't, 1930), aff'd 254
N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930). See LEWIS at 81.
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that its primary rationale for existence is moral purpose."I Not-
ing that such a philosophy is derived from both religion and
utilitarianism, and continues to attract adherents today, Ms.
Lewis points out that "a judge who contends that literature
should uplift the mind has adopted a very narrow theory of art
that, while harmless when held by the average person, can
result in a prejudicial decision in the courtroom." ' She also
notes that many members of the judiciary appear to think that
authors have no purpose other than to embody in their works
a message that could just as well be presented in one way as
in another, and that nothing would be lost by rearranging a
literary work to suit the demands of taboos. Such judges,
failing to realize that literature would have little of signifi-
cance to offer unless it encompassed "the range of articu-
late human imagination as it extends from the height of
imaginative heaven to the depth of imaginative hell,"
thought there was no reason why authors should not be
satisfied to stay within certain bounds in choosing their
subject matter.6
Though she concludes that the history of literary censor-
ship in the United States provides insight into the "national
psyche and our present age as a whole" 7-citing the fear of
discussion of subjects like prostitution, adultery, homosexual-
ity, and intimate bodily functions and the "tendency to view
disturbing phenomena as much less dangerous when ignored
than when exposed by the printed word" 8-Ms. Lewis some-
what curiously refrains from drawing any conclusion as to her
main theme, i.e., the nature and quality of the interaction
between literature and the law. "[lt is entirely possible that
censorship acted as a brake, preventing a precipitous change
in literary mores. However, no direct correlation is evident be-
tween favorable or unfavorable court decisions and the progress
of the sexual revolution in literature available to Americans."
Though such restraint may be an admirable characteristic
of one who poses herself as a mere objective historian, her
stance is belied by the material she presents. Literature, Ob-
scenity & Law is a catalogue of prior restraint, intimidation,
4. LEWIS, at 81.
5. Id. at 82.
6. Id. at 244-45.
7. Id. at 245.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 244.
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destruction of property, financial ruin, and the persistent spec-
tacle of persons basing legal judgments and imposing penal
sanctions on thoroughly untutored assessments of the function
of literature and unprovable assumptions regarding its impact
on society.
Moreover, from a legal standpoint, the correlation, or lack
of it, between court decisions and the progress of the sexual
revolution in literature is beside the point. The issue-which
Ms. Lewis treats rather tentatively in her final chapter on the
impact of the Burger Court decisions in 1973 and 1974-is the
right of individuals in our society to choose for themselves what
they read or view and the inability of government to justify,
constitutionally or pragmatically, interference with the com-
municaton of ideas, or the control of peoples' minds.
Although she dismisses out of hand so called hard-core
pornography as virtually indefensible on any ground, she notes
the return of the Burger Court to outmoded notions regarding
the necessity of protecting that amorphous class usually desig-
nated as weak or susceptible from their own thoughts. Ms.
Lewis points out the irony of Burger's insistence that censor-
ship can be tailored to exclude legitimate ideas from the com-
pass of penal laws, when obscenity litigation over the last 100
years involving major American and European authors has
shown the contrary to be true.
The author's final stance is that we must take the bad with
the good, accept indefensible hard-core material as beyond the
right of government to control in order to protect reputable
authors, booksellers and others. Ultimately, Ms. Lewis posits
Justice Douglas' speech/conduct distinction as the only accept-
able criteria for legal judgment.
Although this book adds little to the wealth of published
information on the history of censorship, it does once again
support the contention that censorship inevitably is unable to
distinguish between the valuable and the valueless in expres-
sive media, no matter how much the censor, in good faith or
bad, attempts to suppress only the hard-core.
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